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Abstract
In an overlapping-generations model with endogenous birth rates, I design
a reform of the pay-as-you-go pension system, which internalises positive ex-
ternalities of children their pension contributions. Individuals may di¤er in
their preferences for children and their ability to have children at all. They
can choose between the status-quo at-rate benets and a new system, in
which they get just the benets that are (on average) nanced by their own
children, reduced by an amount which is used to subsidise the at-rate system.
Whereas people with low child preferences keep the status quo, people with
high child preferences choose the individualised system, having the optimal
incentives to raise children and a higher utility.
Keywords: Overlapping-generations models; Pension reform; Pay-as-you-
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1 Introduction
In most industrialised countries, the prevailing pension system is the pay-as-you-go
(PAYGO) system, in which contributions are immediately paid out to pensioners.
These pension benets are mostly dependent on salaries or wages. But they do
not, or only to a low degree, depend on the individual number of children of the
respective pensioners. This is the case because, originally, the pension systems were
designed as an insurance against infertility and the resulting old-age poverty (Sinn,
2003). But, like any other insurance, the PAYGO pension system implies an in-
centive problem. It distorts the decision of potential parents about the number of
their children downwards. There are empirical studies by Cigno and Rosati (1996),
Ehrlich and Zhong (1998) and Cigno et al. (2003), which suggest that fertility is
really negatively a¤ected by the level of pension benets in countries with such
PAYGO systems. Low birth rates, however, are just the reason for the current pen-
sion crisis in many countries, because the rate of return in a PAYGO system depends
heavily on population growth: the more working people there are per pensioner, the
higher the pension benets are for a given contribution rate (cf. e.g. Gaggermeier
and Lucke, 2002). Germany, where a woman has only 1.4 children on average (Sta-
tistisches Bundesamt, 2000, 2003, Sommer, 2004), is particularly concerned with
this problem.
A transition to fully or partially funded systems, where contributions are invested
in the capital market and paid out to the respective contributors, has been a hotly
disputed issue in the last few years.1 But, it has been argued that such a transition
can never imply a Pareto improvement (unless the transition removes some distor-
tions that are not caused by the nature of the PAYGO system), cf. Fenge (1995),
Sinn (2000), Gaggermeier and Lucke (2002). This is because, when the size of the
PAYGO system is reduced e.g. in favour of a funded system, one generation has to
bear a double burden in satisfying the pension claims of the contemporaneous pen-
sioners and in saving for their own funded pensions. Financing the pensions of the
1Cf. e.g. Börsch-Supan (1998), Kotliko¤ (1996a, 1996b), Feldstein and Samwick (1998) and
Sinn (2000, 2001).
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transition periodby government debt would only redistribute this disadvantage
to one or more following generations, cf. Sinn (2000).
Therefore, Sinn (2001, 2003) and von Auer and Büttner (2004) propose to link
the individual pension benets to the individual number of children in order to re-
establish (at least partly) the right incentives to rear children. The hypothesis that
birth rates are inuenced by economic incentives is supported for instance by a birth
decline in the Saarland after its re-integration into Germany 1957 (where there was
less support for parents with children than before in France) and by a birth increase
in the German Democratic Republic after the enacting of family policies in 1976, cf.
Sinn (2001).
Von Auer and Büttner (2004) have even shown that, if individuals are homoge-
nous, introducing a PAYGO system with a xed proportion between individual
pension benets and children can imply a Pareto improvement2. I am going to ex-
2Sometimes, it is argued that the Pareto criterion cannot be applied if population growth is
endogenous, cf. e.g. Golosov et al. (2004). It is true that the additional children induced by a
reform are not asked if they want to be born and to nance part of pension system; their utility
cannot be compared with the situation without the reform (unless they have a well-dened utility
even in case they are not born). But, I only compare the well-being of the existing individuals of any
generation in two scenarios: with and without a pension reform. I understand the Pareto criterion
as being met if somebody has a higher utility and no individual of any certain characteristics is
worse o¤ with the reform than any individual of the same characteristics without the reform. As
this is true for my as well as for von Auer and Büttners reform proposal, I join von Auer and
Büttner in using the term "Pareto improvement". Readers who do not agree may call the outcome
of the reform a "quasi Pareto improvement" or a sequence of Pareto improvements, given the
population of the respective generation of potential parents". I am not aware of any term being
introduced in the literature for this concept so far. It is similar to Golosov et al.s concept of "A
e¢ ciency" (A like "alive"), where the utility of only those individuals is compared that are born
in all scenarios. Both concepts avoid that utility for (an arbitrary number of) unborn individuals
has to be specied. On the one hand, however, my reform proposal fulls stricter requirements
as I consider all individuals, on the other hand, it may not be an A improvement as I do not
know which individuals were not born without the reform; it might just be those whose utility
is increased by the reform. - A Pareto improvement is given anyway under the assumption that
being born always yields higher utility than being not born.
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pose this approach in the framework of my model. In reality, of course, individuals
are di¤erent, particularly with respect to their preferences for having children and
consuming goods. Some of them are not even able to have children. Those ones
would not receive any pension in von Auer and Büttners system. Such a system
would certainly politically and legally not be feasible.
This paper renes von Auer and Büttners work. In contrast to von Auer and
Büttner (2004) and other contributions that deal with reproduction incentives in
PAYGO systems,3 I allow that individuals of any number di¤er in their preferences
for children or are involuntarily childless. They maximise their lifetime utility -
dependent on consumption during working age and old age as well as on the number
of children - subject to an intertemporal budget constraint, which is a¤ected by the
pension system.
When determining the number of their children, individuals equilibrate marginal
costs and marginal utility. On the one hand, children require consumption expen-
diture and time. On the other hand, they cause felicity to their parents and nance
their pensions. The rst benet of children is considered by potential parents in a
PAYGO system with lump-sum benets, the second one, however, is an external-
ity, which is to be internalised. I show that this can be - partly - done without
disadvantaging anybody by giving to each pensioner the right to choose between
the status-quo at-rate benets and a new, individualised system. In the new sys-
tem, pensioners get the pension benets that are (on average) nanced by their own
children, but reduced by a certain amount which is independent of the individual
children number and which is used to subsidise the at-rate system. People who
have su¢ ciently high child preferences choose the new system, getting the socially
optimal incentive to rear children. I show that this set of individuals is non-empty.
They have a higher utility than in the at-rate system, even if they view a child as
an "inferior good" and have fewer children after the reform.
3E.g. van Groezen et al. (2003), Abío et al. (2004), Cremer et al. (2004a), Cremer et al.
(2004b) or Fenge and Meier (2005); Cremer et al. (2004b), for instance, distinguish individuals by
their costs for raising children, which seems much less plausible to me than di¤erent preferences
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In order to estimate roughly the e¤ects of such a reform on population growth,
welfare and other economic variables, I have calibrated the model with German data
and simulated it with a standard constant-relative-risk-aversion utility function. It
has turned out that, as the relative marginal costs of children and consumption
change, individuals renounce on consumption in favour of children, in fact to such
a degree that the birth rate increases from about 1.4 children per woman to about
1.6.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the basic model.
Section 3 explains the reform proposal, which is illustrated by a simulation in section
4. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
In this overlapping-generations model4, we have individuals that live three periods,
childhood, youth (working age) and old age. While children do not make
any economic decisions, young people decide on their consumption level and how
many children to have, and old people (pensioners) just live o¤ their savings and
the pension they get. The individuals maximise their lifetime utility subject to an
intertemporal budget constraint under perfect foresight. They may di¤er in their
preferences for children and consumption as well as in their ability of having children.
In order to analyse the e¤ects of social security on population growth and welfare,
we must look at the individualsoptimisation problem. The preferences of individ-
ual i are described by a quasi-concave lifetime-utility function of consumption and
children,
ui = ui
 
c1i ; c
2
i ;mi

: (1)
c1iand c
2
i is consumption of an agent born in period  1, i. e. whose autonomous
economic life begins in period  when he or she reaches working age; superscript
1 denotes youth (i. e. in period ) and superscript 2 denotes old age (in period
 + 1). mi is the - by assumption indenitely divisible - number of children of
4Which is developed from a model with exogenous population growth, cf. Bräuninger (1997).
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individual i of generation  . The functional form of ui may be di¤erent for di¤erent
individuals, but generally, it must allow an individual children number of zero, i.e.
ui (c
1
i ; c
2
i ; 0) >  1 if c1i ; c2i > 0, whereas ui (0; c2i ;mi ) = ui (c1i ; 0;mi ) =  1:
The young generations budget constraint equals
c1i + c
0
mi + t + s
1
i = wi ; (2)
where c0 are costs of a child, t are contributions to a pay-as-you-go pension system,
s1i is individual is private saving, and wi is his or her labour income.
5 Pension
contributions are exogenously xed by the government. For simplicity, they are
assumed to be lump-sum contributions. Childrens consumption c0 is also exogenous
and independent of the parentsconsumption.6
When people are old, they consume their savings (including interest) and their
pension benets gi;+1:
c2i = (1 + r+1) s
1
i + gi;+1: (3)
As pension contributions are exogenous, the benets are endogenously determined
(and potentially individually di¤erent). They are computed as follows.
According to the budget constraint of the government, the sum of pension ben-
ets must equal total contributions in each period:
NX
i=1
gi;+1 = t+1N+1; (4)
where N is the number of working-age people in period  (that is the number
of pensioners in period  + 1) and N+1 =
PN
i=1mi is the number of working
5wi generally depends onmi (opportunity costs of forgone labour income), which is considered
in the simulations. For simplicity, in the theoretical part, I assume that wi is independent of mi .
This is theoretically the same as assuming a linear relationship and summarising both consumption
and time costs under c0 , cf. section 4.
6c0 is assumed to grow with the exogenous growth rate of labour productivity, as all variables
like consumption, social security contributions and pension benets do in a steady state. In order
to keep formulas and explanations as simple and descriptive as possible, I refrain from normalising
variables in terms of e¢ ciency units of labour at this point. However, productivity growth must
be taken into account in simulations (see below). Net of productivity growth, c0 is constant.
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individuals in period  + 1: Dividing both sides by N gives
g+1 = t+1m : (5)
g+1 is the average PAYGO pension per pensioner in period  + 1; and m =
N+1
N
is the average number of children per worker in period  (such that m   1 is the
population-growth rate from period  to period  + 1).
Inserting equation (2) for s1i into equation (3) yields generation s lifetime-
budget constraint, according to which the present value of total expenditure equals
the present value of total revenues:
c0mi + c
1
i +
c2i
1 + r+1
+ tIi = wi (6)
with
tIi = t  
gi;+1
1 + r+1
(7)
tIi is the present-value surplus of PAYGO-pension contributions over PAYGO-
pension benets, which is an implicit tax caused by the unfunded pension system.
This is the channel through which the pension system a¤ects the individualschoice
variables and in particular the number of their children.
The individualsproblem is to maximise the utility function (1) subject to the
budget equation (6) and the non-negativity constraints
c1i  0; (8)
c2i  0 (9)
and
mi  0: (10)
While the form of the utility function ensures that the constraints (8) and (9) are not
binding, mi = 0 is allowed, such that we must consider constraint (10) explicitly.
Suppose that each individual gets the same pension g+1: Then, inserting (5) in
(7), the implicit tax becomes
tIi = t  
t+1m
1 + r+1
; (11)
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where the average m is taken as given.7
Maximising (1) subject to (6), (10) and (11) yields the rst-order conditions
@ui
@c1i
= (1 + r+1)
@ui
@c2i
; (12)
@ui
@mi
 c0
@ui
@c1i
(13)
and
mi

@ui
@mi
  c0
@ui
@c1i

= 0: (14)
The standard Euler equation (12) holds if saving an additional unit of income for
the retirement period yields the same utility as consuming it in the working period.
Equation (13) states that the marginal utility of a child must be lower than or equal
to marginal costs, c0 , evaluated with the marginal utility of income. Because of (14),
it can be lower only if mi = 0: Equations (12) to (14) together with (6) determine
individual is choice variables c1i , c
2
i and mi , where mi must full both (13) and
(14). Of course, for individuals who are not able to have children, (13) and (14) do
not apply; those individuals only choose c1i and c
2
i :
3 Reform proposal: individualisation of pension
benets
It can be easily shown that a reduction in the contributions to the pay-as-you-
go system decreases the implicit tax in the long run.8 This means an increase in
disposable income, inducing a positive income e¤ect on consumption and birth rates
and, thereby, causing higher population growth and higher utility. But, this kind of
reform can never bring about a Pareto improvement. When the contributions are
decreased, the contemporaneous pensioners are disadvantaged since they get lower
7When t grows with the rate of labour productivity, p, such that t+1 = t (1 + p+1) (e.g. in
a steady state), the implicit tax is positive if (and only if) the growth rate of e¤ective labour,
(1 + p+1)m   1; is lower than the market interest rate. In the long run, this must be the case,
see Sinn (2001).
8See equation (11) and footnote 7.
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pension benets without having paid less when they were young, see Gaggermeier
and Lucke (2002). Financing the pensions of the transition periodby government
debt would only redistribute this disadvantage to one or more following generations,
cf. Sinn (2000).
Von Auer and Büttner (2004) show that, if individuals are homogenous, individ-
ualising pension benets achieves a Pareto improvement. Individualisation means
that each individual gets exactly the benets that are nanced by their own chil-
dren:9
gi;+1 = t+1mi : (15)
Summing up over N yields equation (4); the budget constraint of the PAYGO
pension system is clearly fullled. Moreover, the implicit tax becomes
tIi = t  
t+1mi
1 + r+1
: (16)
It depends on the individual number of children and is not taken as given any more.
Now, the rst-order conditions (13) and (14) become
@ui
@mi
+
t+1
1 + r+1
@ui
@c1i
 c0
@ui
@c1i
(17)
and
mi

@ui
@mi
+
t+1
1 + r+1
@ui
@c1i
  c0
@ui
@c1i

= 0; (18)
respectively. There is an additional term, which represents an additional marginal
utility of children: the present value of the pension contribution by an additional
child, that is the additional pension benet for the individual i of generation  ,
evalutated with his or her marginal utility of income. This is just the externality
of children which is internalised by the reform. Now, potential parents consider all
benets when deciding on the number of their children and, thus, they have the
socially optimal incentives in this respect.
If all individuals are identical, such that they all have the averagem without the
reform, they have the option of achieving the same pension with the same number
of children as before, cf. equations (5) and (15). If they do so, nothing changes,
9In practice, t+1 would be the average contribution per child.
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including consumption and utility. But, individuals can increase the number of their
children and will do so, at least if the original number is positive. This is because
for the value of mi that equilibrates equation (13), marginal benets in terms of
utility exceed marginal costs according to equation (17). Increasing mi increases
utility. That is, we have a feasible Pareto improvement.
In reality, however, individuals di¤er in their preferences for having children and
consuming goods. Some people are even unable to have children (they could only
adopt them). Implementing the above-described reform strictly would disadvantage
those individuals whose preference for children is su¢ ciently low. Infertile individ-
uals or ones whose preference for children is so low that they do not want to have
any even with the reform would not get any pension benets at all. This would
politically as well as legally certainly not be feasible. Nor would it be fair, because
those people have contributed to the system (even though paying contributions is
not enough since children are also required).
Therefore, I propose a modied reform. This reform provides the incentives of
individualisation for part of the individuals, but it ensures that nobody is worse o¤
than without the reform.
According to this proposal, individuals get the right to choose between the status-
quo at-rate pension system and a new, individualisedsystem. In this new system,
pensioners get the benets that can be nanced by their own children, but reduced
by a lump-sum amount which is used for subsidisingthe pensioners whose number
of children is not su¢ cient to nance the status-quo pension level for their parents.
Formally, the pension benets are determined as
gi;+1 = g
NI
+1 (19)
(where gNI+1 denotes level in the non-individualised system, i.e. the status-quo level)
for all individuals that have chosen the old system and
gi;+1 = t+1mi   a+1 (20)
with
a+1 =
1
N
NX
j=N+1
(gj;+1   t+1mj ) (21)
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for all individuals i that have chosen the new system. Let all individuals be sorted
in descending order of children number, such that the individuals j 2 f1; 2; :::; N g
prefer the individualised system and the individuals j 2 fN + 1; N + 2; :::; Ng
choose the at-rate system. The amount a+1 is the sum of the nance gapsof all
old-system pensioners, divided by the number of all new-system pensioners. For the
pension and the children number of the old-system pensioners, the respective status-
quo quantities gNI+1 and m
NI
j can be inserted into equation (21). Using equation (5),
the following expression for a+1 results:
a+1 =
N  N
N
t+1
 
mNI   emNI  ; (22)
where mNI =
1
N
PN
j=1m
NI
j is the status-quo average children number and emNI =
1
N N
PN
j=N+1
mNIj is the average children number of old-system pensioners after
the reform. mNI   emNI is the lack of children per pensioner in the at-rate system.
This is multiplied with the pension contribution per child and the number of the
concerning pensioners, giving the totally required subsidy that must be paid by the
N pensioners in the individualised system. When calculating the benets for a
pensioner in the new system, a+1 must be subtracted from the amount contributed
by the respective pensioners children.
Inserting equation (20) for gi;+1 in (7) gives the expression
tIi = t  
t+1mi   a+1
1 + r+1
(23)
for the implicit tax. Utility maximisation yields exactly the optimality conditions
(17) and (18) then. This is because a+1 is independent of the children number mi
of individual i. Thus, the individuals that have chosen the individualised system
have the socially optimal incentives to rear children. They have a higher utility than
in the status quo with at-rate pension benets, which they could have also got.
a is constructed in such a way that the budget constraint (4) of the social se-
curity is fullled. This can be easily shown by inserting equation (21) into (20),
multiplying both equation sides with N and summing up over all new-system pen-
sioners, see appendix 1.
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But, who chooses the individualised system? Individuals prefer this system if
and only if it provides them with at least the same pension level as the at-rate
system, i.e. if
t+1mi   a+1  gNI+1 = t+1mNI : (24)
Letm be the indi¤erence number of children, for which t+1m

 a+1 = gNI+1 holds.
Then, people with mi  m after the reform choose the new system.
This is illustrated in gure 1, where line AA is the status-quo pension-benet
function of children, line BB is the benet function with full individualisation (run-
ning through the "status-quo point" S, which denotes the status-quo average chil-
dren number and status-quo pension level) and line CC is the benet function in the
individualised part of the partially individualised system.10 As with partial individ-
ualisation people can choose the part which provides them with the higher pension,
the bold line ATC is the relevant benet function .
Figure 2 claries the consequences of the di¤erent pension systems for the birth
rates. First, assume that the utility function (1) can be equivalently (with respect
to the outcome of its maximisation) written as a function of only two variables, ci
and mi , where ci  c1i + c
2
i
1+r+1
is the present value of total consumption.11 Now,
the individualsdecision problem can be illustrated in a two-goods (children and
total consumption) diagram.
Present-value net income (labour income minus pension contributions plus dis-
counted pension income, see c axis) can be used for children or consumption. Line
AA is the status-quo budget constraint for every individual, cf. equations (6) and
(11).12 Its slope is   1
c0
, the negative ratio of (marginal) costs of consumption and
children. Line BB, in contrast, is the budget constraint for every individual in the
10Note that mi on the x-axis of gure 1 denotes the children number after the reform, not the
status-quo number. Through the reform, an individual with an optimal status-quo m below m
may have got an optimal m above m because of the higher incentives.
11This can be easily shown to be the case for a standard CRRA utility function, cf. appendix 3.
12All letters in gure 2 correspond to the same letters in gure 1.
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Figure 1: Child-related pension benets
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Figure 2: Budget constraints
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fully individualised system, cf. equations (6) and (16). It is steeper (  1
c0 
t+1
1+r+1
) be-
cause the marginal costs of children are lower (where the additional pension nanced
by an additional child is interpreted as negative costs). Individualising the pension
system, however, does not only imply an upwards turn of the budget line, but also
a shift to the left. This is because the at-rate pension gNI+1 is not paid out any
more. Line BB must run through the status-quo point S, which combines status-quo
average children number and consumption and which can always be achieved in the
fully individualised system.
In the individualised part of the partially individualised system, marginal costs
and thus the slope of the budget line are the same as in the fully individualised
system, but the shift goes even further, since the amount a+1 must be subtracted
additionally. The corresponding budget line CC must cross line AA at the point T
or the indi¤erence children number m , respectively. But, since people can choose
between the individualised and the at-rate pension, the envelope of the two feasible
sets is the relevant constraint. Of course, a+1 and thus the position of the CC line
itself depend on the individualsdecision regarding the individualised or the at-
rate part of the partially individualised system. View the bold line CTA as the
relevant budget constraint for every individual, given the optimal behaviour of all
other individuals.
Now, what does this mean for the individuals decisions? Obviously, for any
form of a quasi-concave utility function and convex indi¤erence curves, individuals
whose status-quo children number is above m - e.g. at point P - always choose the
individualised pension. On the other hand, there may be individuals whose status-
quo tangent solution (or even border solution with mi = 0) is right of T and who
are better o¤ with the individualised pension nevertheless.
Figure 2 also shows that some individuals in the individualised part may have
fewer children than without the reform. Suppose that the indi¤erence curves drawn
in gure 2 describe the preferences of an individual i, who takes the budget line
CTA as given. For i, children are inferior to such a degree that, as a consequence of
the reform, he or she chooses Pinstead of P, which implies a lower children number
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mi ; a negative income e¤ect dominates a positive substitution e¤ect on mi .
The possibility that the reform provides some individuals with higher pension
benets for the same children number, implying a higher consumption level, can be
demonstrated as follows. First, assume that only one individual i with the origi-
nal optimum P chooses the individualised pension. In this case, the line CC runs
through point P, since with the original children number, i would get the original
pension and can a¤ord the original consumption level; i reaches a higher indi¤erence
curve with a higher number of children, because is new budget line is tangent to a
higher indi¤erence curve above P, even if i views children as an inferior good. Now,
however, assume that another individual j, whose original optimum is right of P,
also chooses the individualised pension because his or her originally achieved indif-
ference curve intersects with the CC line through P. This additional individual in
the individualised part of the pension system reduces the ratio N N


N
, so that a+1
becomes smaller (unless the decrease in N N


N
is overcompensated by a decrease inemNI ), cf. equation (22), and the CC line shifts to the right, lets say to the points
Pand T. Now, i gets higher pension benets without changing his or her children
number because his or her support of other families is lower than originally. - Of
course, is situation cannot apply for all individuals in the individualised part of the
system. In total, the birth rate must be higher than in the status quo; otherwise,
there would be no resources for the larger feasible set of c-m combinations.
The set of individuals who prefer the individualised system is non-empty. Assume
that at the most one person, like i in the example above, chooses the new system.
Then, doing so is indeed worth for that person, which is formally shown in appendix
2. The intuitive explanation is the following. For all other people, everything
remains the same. They have the status-quo number of children and get the status-
quo pension benets. That is, with the reform, is family must subsidise the other
pensioners (or are subsidised by them) with the same amount as without the reform.
Consequently, the gain of pension contributions through is additional children can
be used exclusively for is benets, such that i is better o¤ in the new system than
in the old one. In other words, i can always achieve the status-quo combination of
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children and consumption, but relative costs have changed in favour of children. As
explained above, his or her new budget line CC in gure 2 runs through his or her
original (interior) consumption/children point, so that he or she has more children
for sure.
Note that there is no transition dynamics with a double burden. In the pe-
riod in which the new system is introduced, both pension contributions and bene-
ts (for the contemporanous pensioners) are still status-quo; one generation later,
individualised-system pensioners receive a pension according to the number of their
children; higher benets can be nanced by a higher number of contributors.
4 Implemention in a total model and simulation
The above-described pension reform has been implemented in a basic total model13
of a small open economy with perfect capital mobility and an exogenous interest rate.
There is a representative rm, which maximises prots under perfect competition
in good and factors markets, producing a homogenous good with a Cobb-Douglas
technology and employing labour and capital. Households maximise their lifetime
utility as described in section 3, but in addition to consumption costs for children,
they face opportunity costs of foregone labour income:
wi = iw ; (25)
where the individual labour-force-participation rate i is a function of the individual
number of children:
i = 1   mi : (26)
The general wage w depends only on the exogenous interest rate and on the parame-
ters of the production function14 (such that marginal costs of children are  w + c0
instead of c0 only).
13Based on Gaggermeier and Lucke (2002).
14I assume that the general wage rate w is independent of  and m. It can be shown that this
is true with a Cobb-Douglas technology, because in this case, the positive e¤ects of higher labour
input on the optimal capital stock and on output for a given capital stock just balance out with
19
For the utility function, the following CRRA form is assumed, where the weight
of children, "i, di¤ers between individuals:
ui = log c
1
i +  log c
2
i + "i log (1 +mi ) (27)
with  and "i positive. It allows mi = 0; in this case, the last term vanishes. With
this functional form, both consumption and children are normal goods, as is shown
in appendix 3.
For simplicity, the population is grouped into three types of identical individuals
with shares j =
Nj
N
, j = 1; 2; 3. Let "(j) and m(j) denote the child-preference
parameter and children number of the type-j individuals, respectively, and assume
that "(1) > "(2) applies and that type 3 is infertile such that m(1) > m
(2)
 > m(3) = 0.
When calculating the individualised pension, two cases must be distinguished:15
a) m(2) > m . Then
gi;+1 = t+1mi   3
1 + 2
gNI+1 = t+1mi   a+1 (28)
for all i 2 T1 [ T2:
b) m(2) < m : Then
gi;+1 = t+1mi   2
1
 
gNI+1   t+1m(2)
  3
1
gNI+1 = t+1mi   a+1 (29)
for all i 2 T1:
Tj is the set of type-j individuals.16
The parameters and exogenous variables are calibrated with German data as
follows:
the negative e¤ect on marginal labour productivity, cf. Gaggermeier and Lucke (2002). And (the
log of) a Cobb-Douglas function can be viewed as a (linear) approximation of any functional form,
such that the e¤ect of varying labour supply on w is supposed to be negligible.
15Note that m1 > m must necessarily apply, cf. section 3.
16Note that
 
gNI+1   t+1m2

can be either positive or negative, depending on whether m2
is larger or smaller than the average status-quo number of children.
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1 2 3  "
(1) "(2)
0.67 0.27 0.06 0.31 1.5 0.5
c0 t r+1     p
125,000 225,000 2.34 0.27 0.73 0.46 0.23 0.64
The shares of the three types have been calibrated as 1 = 0:67, 2 = 0:27
and 3 = 0:06. This reects the observation (or estimation, respectively) that in
Germany about one third of women do not have any children and that about six
percent are supposed to be involuntarily childless.
The discount factor  is chosen in such a way that a steady-state consumption
ratio c2=c
1
 of slightly above 1 results;  = 0:31 corresponds to a yearly rate of time
preference of 4%. Given all other parameters, the child-preference parameters "(1)
and "(2) are set such that the observed status-quo birth rate is reproduced. They
are also consistent with the fact that women who have at least one child, mostly
have two children or more (and about two on average). "(3) is irrelevant since type
3 is assumed to be infertile.
c0 = 125; 000 EUR in prices of 1995 is a rough estimate gained from the compari-
son of consumption data of di¤erently sized households.17 The pension contribution
t = 225; 000 EUR correspond to a contribution rate of 19.8%.
r+1 is the 1992 to 1999 average real rate of return (4.1% per year) of long-term
government bonds, both related to a 30-year interval.
The production elasticities of capital, , and labour, , (with  +  = 1) and
the depreciation rate  together with the interest rate determine the overall wage
rate w .  = 0:73 is calibrated with the average labour-income share (Lohnquote)
of 1991 to 2000.  = 0:46 resulted as residual of the capital-demand equation.
 is estimated with OLS using German time-series data from 1964 to 1998, where
the estimation equation is (standard errors in brackets):
 = 1  (0:256
(0:005)
  0:024
(0:005)
D90  0:045
(0:006)
D9198) m +  (30)
17See Statistisches Bundesamt (German Federal Statistical O¢ ce, 2000): Statistical Yearbook
for the Federal Republic of Germany, 547.
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with
 = 0:791
(0:083)
 1 +  (31)
m is calculated as the ratio of people below 30 and between 30 and 60 (yearly
average).  is the ratio of labour-force participants between 30 and 60 and total
population between 30 and 60, respectively. D90 (equals 1 in 1990) and D9198
(equals 1 from 1991 on) are dummy variables, which are justied by the German
reunion at the end of 1989 and the switch from Western German to German data
after 1990. For the error term  , it was allowed for rst-order autocorrelation. 
is white noise. Consequently, for  0:256  0:045  0:21 results.
p, nally, is growth rate of labour productivity (GDP per worker in prices of
1995) from 1992 to 1999.18 It is needed to simulate a growing economy. In a steady
state, all macroeconomic variables grow with the rate of p, cf. Gaggermeier and
Lucke (2002).
The following table contains some selected simulation results. The status quo
(no individualisation, NI) is compared with the proposed reform of a partial
individualisation(PI) and a full individualisation (FI) without Pareto improvement
according to von Auer and Büttner (cf. section 3). Clearly, m(2) < m applies, so
that the share of people in the new system is 1 = 0:67. (Subscripts always denote
the types.)
18p = 0:64 corresponds to a yearly rate of 1.7%; Statistisches Bundesamt (2000).
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NI PI FI
m(1) 1.05 1.21 1.43
m(2) 0 0 0.15
m(3) 0 0 0
m 0.70 0.81 1.00
Pension rates of return 0.5 1.1 2.9
(yearly, in percent) 0.5 0.5 -4.6
0.5 0.5 -100
c1(1), percentage change - -7.2 -11.5
c1(2) - 0 -10.3
c1(3) - 0 -6.4
Yearly growth rate of pop. -1.2 -0.7 0.0
Yearly growth rate of GDP 0.5 1.0 1.7
The left column shows the status quo, in which a woman has about 1.4 children
on average, so thatm equals 0.7. While type-3 individuals are involuntarily childless,
type-2 individuals are assumed to not want to have any children. As many values
of " are compatible with a children number of zero, "(2) is chosen such that type-2
individuals almostwish to have children (but that m(2) is lower than 0.001).
The right column shows the fully individualised PAYGO system, where all in-
dividuals are provided with the optimal incentives. These induce more children
(normal goods with the underlying CRRA utility function) for both types 1 and 2,
implying that the population nearly remains constant (m = 1). But, only type 1 is
better o¤ in this system than in the non-individualised one. For type 2, in contrast,
the return to the pension system is negative, for type 3, it is even minus 100 percent,
since he or she contributes to the system without getting any benets. Consumption
during the working age (and equally in the old age) is lower for all individuals. This
is for type 3 because of his or her missing pension benets and for type 1 because
of his or her higher costs for more children, in spite of higher pension benets. For
type 2, the decrease in consumption is lower than for type 1, even though type 2
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su¤ers a loss in pension benets; but, his or her children costs increase by much less
than those of type 1.
In the middle column, the e¤ects of the partial individualisation are described.
Type 1 has the optimal incentives to have children just as in the fully individualised
system, but there is a negative income e¤ect caused by the amount a; decreasing the
pension benets. Thus, type 1 has fewer children than with full individualisation.
His or her consumption level is lower than in the status quo because of the higher
children costs (and despite the higher pension), but it is higher than with full in-
dividualisation because of the lower children costs (and despite the lower pension).
For type-2 and type-3 individuals, in contrast, nothing changes compared with the
non-individualised (status-quo) system.
Utility corresponds to the pension rate of return, which represents the outcome
of the pension reforms for the individuals. Type 1 prefers partial individualisation
to no individualisation and full individualisation to partial individualisation; types
2 and 3 are indi¤erent between no and partial individualisation, but are worse o¤
with full individualisation. The growth rates of population and GDP (level, not per
capita) correspond to the average children number.
5 Concluding remarks
In an overlapping-generations model with endogenous birth rates, I constructed
a PAYGO-pension-system reform, which implies a Pareto improvement - provided
that the Pareto criterion is accepted with endogenous population size and given that
peoplesexpectations are correct - even if any number of individuals has di¤erent
preferences and a child is an inferior good. This improvement is based on removing
a distortion in PAYGO systems in which e¤orts for raising children are not appro-
priately honoured; the childrens pension contributions are an externality in so far
as the pension benets do not depend on the individual number of children.
Since a Pareto improvement requires that nobody loses, people get the option
of keeping the status quo. People with su¢ ciently high preferences for children,
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however, are better o¤ in an individualised pension system, in which they get exactly
the amount of pension benets - before subtracting a lump-sum amount necessary
for subsidising part of the status-quo pensioners - which is (expectedly) nanced by
their own children.
In reality, of course, this calculation would have to be based on contributions
averaged over all contributors, because children di¤er in their luck and their abil-
ities, which their parents are not (fully) responsible for. In principle, the (model-
exogenous) pension contributions per contributor can be computed by multiply-
ing a xed contribution rate with the labour income of all contributors within one
generations time and dividing this contribution sum by the (average) number of
contributors. Details would remain to be dened. Especially, this reform would
not be impeded by the existence of unemployed or self-employed people, who are
not liable for contributions to the public PAYGO pension system. In the case of
self-employment, e.g., it could be assumed that out of the group of self-employed
parents, about the same number of children becomes contributors as the other way
around. If there are already reproduction incentives in an existing pension system,
this system can be theoretically split up in such a way that the reform is applied
only to the fraction of contributions which is used to nance at-rate benets in the
sense of this paper.
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Appendix 1: Social-security budget Proof that the social-security budget is
fullled after the pension reform of partial individualisation:
Inserting equation (21) into (20) yields:
gi;+1 = t+1mi   1
N
NX
j=N+1
(gj;+1   t+1mj )
for all individuals i 2 f1; 2; :::; N g. Re-arranging terms, multiplying both sides with
N ,
(gi;+1   t+1mi )N =  
NX
j=N+1
(gj;+1   t+1mj ) ;
and summing up over all new-system pensioners,
NX
i=1
(gi;+1   t+1mi )N =  
NX
i=1
NX
j=N+1
(gj;+1   t+1mj ) ;
gives
N
NX
i=1
(gi;+1   t+1mi ) =  
NX
j=N+1
(gj;+1   t+1mj )
NX
i=1
1;
NX
i=1
(gi;+1   t+1mi ) +
NX
j=N+1
(gj;+1   t+1mj ) =
NX
j=1
(gj;+1   t+1mj )
= 0
or
NX
j=1
gj;+1 = t+1N+1
The sum of pension benets equals total contributions in each period, which was to
be shown.
Appendix 2: Does anybody choose the new system? Suppose that at most
one individual i chooses the individualised system. Then, according to equation (24)
and using equation (21) with N = 1 (but without ordering the individuals), he or
she does so if
gi;+1 = t+1mi   a+1 = t+1mi  
NX
j=1
j 6=i
 
gNI+1   t+1mNIj
  gNI+1
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or
t+1mi + t+1
NX
j=1
j 6=i
mNIj 
NX
j=1
gNI+1 = Ng
NI
+1 = N t+1m
NI

or
mi +
NX
j=1
j 6=i
mNIj  NmNI =
NX
j=1
mNIj = m
NI
i +
NX
j=1
j 6=i
mNIj
or
mi  mNIi :
To get at least the same pension in the individualised system as in the status quo,
i must have at least as many children. This is the case, since in the individualised
system, the individual marginal utility of children is higher than in the status-quo
system, cf. equations (13) and (17).
Appendix 3: Utility as a function of total consumption and children For
illustration in a two-goods diagram, the CRRA utility function
ui = log c
1
i +  log c
2
i + "i log (1 +mi )
can be transformed into a function of the two arguments ci  c1i + c
2
i
1+r+1
andemit  1 +mi if the optimal consumption ratio c2ic1i =  (1 + r+1) is presumed:
c2i =  (1 + r+1) c
1
i =) ci = (1 + ) c1i ;
such that
ui = log
1
1 + 
ci+ log
 (1 + r+1)
1 + 
ci+"i log emit = konst+(1 + ) log ci+"i log emit
or
eui = log ci + e"i log emit (32)
with e"i  "i1+ .
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In the following, I show that this utility function implies that both consumption
and children are normal goods. Implicitly di¤erentiating (32) gives
demit
dci
=   emite"ici
for the slope of the indi¤erence curves. This remains constant if children and con-
sumption are increased (or decreased) proportionally, that is on any ray through the
origin of a ci -emit diagram. Thus, after an income increase, or a shift of the budget
constraint to the right, the ratio of emit and ci must not change; if ci is increased,emit and consequently mi = emit 1 must be also increased;19 decreasing both quan-
tities, in contrast, would contradict the standard assumption of non-satisfaction.
19It can be easily shown that the increase in mit must be even higher than the increase in ci .
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